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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TRACEY JOE McCLOY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990117-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine in a drug 
free zone with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
58-37-8(1), -8(4) (1998), possession of marijuana in a drug free zone with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1), -8(4) 
(1998), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998), in the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly conclude that there was probable cause to search 
defendant's residence? On appeal, the appellate court does not conduct a de novo review 
of the magistrate's probable cause determination, see State v. Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 885 
(Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), but only 
"determines whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that 
there were enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." State v. 
Potter. 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
2. Has defendant demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective? If a claim of 
ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal, it will be reviewed only "if the trial 
record is adequate to permit decision of the issue . . . . " State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 
1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
3. Should this Court consider the multiple issues raised in defendant's pro se 
supplemental brief where defendant has failed to adequately brief the issue? "'[I]t is well 
established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has 
failed to adequately brief.'99 State v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269, 272 (Utah 1999) (citing 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
attached at Addendum A: 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Tracy McCloy, was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a 
drug free zone with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
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Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1), -8(4) (1998) (Count I), possession of marijuana in a drug free zone 
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-
37-8(1), -8(4) (1998) (Count II), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998) (Count III) (R. 1-3). 
Defendant, pro se, moved to dismiss the charges, alleging various police misconduct, and 
to suppress the evidence obtained in a search of his residence (R. 101-183). Following a 
hearing on April 28, 1998 (R. 389:Tab 1:1-123), the trial court denied both motions 
(Memorandum Decision, R. 185-187). Represented by counsel, defendant filed a new 
motion to suppress evidence (R. 236, 254-57). Following a hearing on June 26, 1998 (R. 
389:Tab 2:1-23), the trial court denied the motion (Memorandum Decision, R. 268-71, 
"Ruling," attached at Addendum B), based on a review of the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant (R. 188-94, attached at Addendum C). A jury convicted defendant on all 
counts (R. 331-33). The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive statutory five-to-
life (Count I) and one-to-fifteen year (Count II) terms in the Utah State Prison, merging 
the sentence on Count III with the other two sentences (R. 362-63). The Utah Supreme 
Court poured this case over to this Court on March 16, 1999. 
Defendant timely appealed and thereafter filed an opening brief through his 
appellate counsel, Maurice Richards, on June 21, 1999 (R. 381). Defendant, pro se, filed 
a motion for reappointment of counsel. This Court denied the motion on September 7, 
1999, but granted defendant leave to file a pro se supplemental brief. The State's brief 
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herein is responsive to both defendant's opening and supplemental briefs. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On March 13, 1997, Agent Mark Acker, assigned to the Weber Morgan Narcotics 
Strike Force, prepared and signed an affidavit in support of a warrant to search 
defendant's residence, a white house located at 1612 Kiesel Ave., Ogden, Utah, based on 
probable cause that defendant was in possession of marijuana, methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia used to consume and sell these controlled substances (R. 188-89, 192). 
The affidavit recited the following facts in support of probable cause that 
controlled substances would be found on the premises: (1) Agent Acker's extensive 
experience in drug interdiction (R. 189); (2) Odgen Police computer records verified that 
defendant had given 1612 Kiesel Ave. as his residence (R. 191); (3) information from a 
citizen informant who observed heavy short term vehicular and pedestrian traffic in which 
numerous different people stayed for both short and long periods of time and brought 
1
 Because the brief filed by defendant's appellate counsel addresses issues related 
only to defendant's motion to suppress evidence, and because defendant's pro se 
supplemental brief is unsupported by any record support, this factual statement recites 
facts related only to the motion to suppress. Those facts are recited most favorably to the 
trial court's findings denying the motion to suppress. State v. Tetmyer. 947 P.2d 1157, 
1158 (Utah App. 1997) ("Because we are reviewing the trial court's decision denying 
defendant's motion to suppress, we recite the facts in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings.") (citing State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The 
State's statement of facts substantially restates facts set out in the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant at issue in this case. Although defendant claims the affidavit sets out 
insufficient probable cause to support the warrant, he does not challenge the accuracy of 
the affidavits. 
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stereos and other personal property into defendant's residence (R. 189-90); (4) 
information from a reliable confidential informant that drugs could readily be purchased 
at defendant's residence and that a great deal of stolen property from the Ogden area was 
being traded for methamphetamine at defendant's residence (R. 190); (5) the police 
determined that some of the visitors to defendant's residence were involved in drugs or 
receiving stolen property (R. 190); (6) within the previous four days a confidential 
informant, on whom CI control methods were applied, and an unwitting informant had 
purchased methamphetamine on two occasions, one of which buys was observed by an 
undercover agent (R. 190); and (7) the day before the affidavit was signed, a person 
arrested in an unrelated drug investigation told another agent of the Davis Metro 
Narcotics Force that he was buying methamphetamine from a male named "Tracey" who 
lived in a white house on Kiesel Ave. between 16th and 17th Streets in which there was 
stolen property, such as stereos, and that "Tracey" sold ounces of methamphetamine at 
the house (R. 191). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court correctly determined that there was probable cause to search 
defendant's residence. The court made its determination of probable cause based on its 
review of the affidavit in support of the warrant and without reliance on any prior 
hearings, transcriptions of which defendant has failed to make part of the record on 
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appeal. Also, defendant has failed to marshal the facts recited in the affidavit which show 
that he was involved in the drug trade and engaged in drug sales out of his residence a 
few days before the affidavit was drafted. 
POINT II 
Because defendant has failed to specifically identify what prior proceedings his 
counsel failed to consider and has failed to make such proceedings part of the record on 
appeal, this Court should decline to consider his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Alternatively, defendant has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel for lack of a supporting record. 
POINT HI 
The Court should decline to consider claims made by defendant, pro se, in his 
supplemental brief. The claims are generally made without citation to the record and 
unsupported by relevant legal authority. More importantly, defendant has generally failed 
to include in the record on appeal alleged evidence in support of his claims. In those 
instances where record evidence is available, it fails to support defendant's claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT AMPLY SETS FORTH EVIDENCE OF THE 
INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
SUPPORT THE WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SEARCH OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE 
Defendant cursorily asserts that the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress is 
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based on an inadequate record and that the court incorrectly determined that the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant set forth probable cause for the search. Specifically, 
defendant asserts that the ruling was based on the court's familiarity with information 
alleged to be unavailable, an affidavit which recited only unverified tips and the affiant 
officer's unverified tips, and an improper discounting of police misconduct. Br. App. at 
11-13. The trial court's ruling, on its face, readily disposes of defendant's arguments. 
A. Defendant Fails to Show that the Record is Inadequate 
to Support the Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions, 
1. Review of a Trial Court's Findings is Highly Deferential. 
In State v. Pena, the Utah Supreme Court set out a highly deferential standard for 
reviewing a trial court's findings of fact: 
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making 
determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court 
under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find clear 
error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the trial couifs determination. See Wessel v. 
Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985): see also United 
States v. United States Gvpsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 68 
S. Ct. 525 (1948). This standard is highly deferential to the trial court 
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the 
evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to be 
in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a 
sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot 
hope to garner from a cold record. In re J. Children. 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 
(Utah 1983). [Emphasis added.] 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). "Clear error is indicated when the trial 
court's factual assessment is against the clear weight of the evidence or it induces a firm 
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conviction that a mistake has been committed." State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, 
(Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)). 
2. The Trial Court Reasonably Based its Ruling on the Affidavit. 
The trial court acknowledged in its ruling that it had become very familiar with the 
case from prior hearings and from reading the file in its entirety several times (R. 268). 
Defendant asserts that relevant portions of the prior proceedings, including videotapes, 
are "unavailable," and therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling. There 
are several flaws in defendant's argument. 
First, in challenging a trial court's findings, a defendant bears the burden of 
marshaling all the evidence and then showing, in spite of all the evidence, that the court's 
findings of fact are clearly erroneous. State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487,491 (Utah App. 
1992). 
Rule 12(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include 
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct 
appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
If a critical portion of the record necessary for this Court to determine the issues on 
appeal is missing, the burden is on defendant to reconstruct it. See Utah R. App. P. 12(g) 
("If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a 
transcript is unavailable,... the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
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proceedings from the best available means, including recollection."); Guardian State 
Bank v. Humphervs, 762 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988) (purpose of the rule is to avoid the 
court's attempting to recreate the record of a hearing based upon conflicting testimony of 
counsel). Defendant has neither precisely identified which portions of the record are 
unavailable nor made any attempt to reconstruct such record. Without a record, which 
defendant implicitly argues would alter the outcome of the case, this Court must presume 
the trial court's ruling was founded on sufficient evidence. See State v. Blubaugh. 904 
P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995) (an appellate court will "assume the regularity of the 
proceedings below when appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal") 
(citing Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 
(Utah 1996). 
In any case, the ruling, by its terms, does not rely on prior proceedings. While 
recognizing that there were prior hearings, the court commenced its discussion by stating: 
"Other issues, however, are raised in this motion" (R. 268). The court then proceeded to 
note the impropriety of some of the police conduct and stated: "The court has taken this 
police/prosecution position into consideration in reviewing the claims of the defendant in 
this case" (R. 269). Thereafter, the court assessed the showing of probable cause based 
only on the affidavit in support of the search warrant, as agreed by counsel at the hearing 
9 
(R. 269; 389:2-3).2 There is no indication that any other record was important to the court 
in assessing probable cause. 
B. The Affidavit Amply Supports the Confidential Informant's 
Reliability and Probable Cause to Search Defendant's Residence, 
1. The Appellate Court Reviews the Magistrate's 
Determination of Probable Cause Deferentially. 
"Before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must review an affidavit 
containing specific facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause." State v. 
Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App.1993) (citing State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 
(Utah App. 1992)) (citation omitted). "In determining whether probable cause exists, the 
magistrate must 'make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of 
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" id. (citing Illinois 
v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)). 
On appeal, the appellate court does not conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination, see State v. Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah 
App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), but only "determines 
2
 The hearing on defendant's motion to suppress was held on June 26, 1998 (R. 
389:1). The only exception to the blanket sufficiency of the record at this hearing was the 
court's recognition that it found the omission of the year in which the search warrant was 
signed a technical defect remedied by evidence from an earlier hearing (R. 389:11-12). 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the technical sufficiency of the search warrant. 
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whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there were 
enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." Potter 860 P.2d at 
956 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the appellate court reviews the affidavit in m"its 
entirety and in a common sense fashion/"" according deference to the magistrate's 
determination. State v. Jackson. 937 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied. 945 
P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
2. The Warrant was Supported by Probable Cause 
The court reviewed the essential assertions set out in the affidavit: 
- the affiant (Agent Mark Acker, Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force), was a 
12-year veteran police officer with extensive experience in drug 
interdiction (R. 269);3 
- one month earlier a citizen informant contacted Agent Acker and told him that 
there was heavy short term vehicular and pedestrian traffic, in which 
numerous different people stayed for both short and long periods of time; 
the traffic peaked on Fridays and continued through the weekend, during 
which time some people brought VCR's, stereos and other property to 
defendant's residence; based on his experience, the agent recognized that 
the heavy flow of people with such personal property indicated illegal drug 
activity (R. 269-70); 
- another agent (Agent Van Orden) informed Agent Acker that a very reliable 
confidential informant informed Agent Van Orden that drugs could be 
purchased from defendant (R. 270); 
- based on a check of license plate numbers, several of the owners of vehicles 
going to defendant's residence were involved in drugs or receiving 
stolen property; 
3
 The affidavit sets out in detail and at considerable length Agent Acker's 
extensive experience and training in drug interdiction (R. 189). 
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another agent (Agent King) reported to Agent Acker that within the previous 
four days a wired confidential informant, with an unwitting informant, on 
two separate occasions had purchased drugs, which later field tested 
positive for amphetamines (R. 270); one of the buys was observed by 
an undercover agent (R. 270).4 
The court recognized, in detail, what it considered to be inappropriate police and 
prosecution conduct in pursuing defendant in this and other cases, and improper, 
potentially inflammatory information relating to defendant's criminal history in the 
affidavit (R. 269-71). Nonetheless, the court concluded, "[u]pon careful consideration of 
the totality of properly included facts, and in considering the possibility of improper 
inflammatory statements being included in the affidavit and an overzealous attitude by the 
police towards the defendant, the court concludes there was still more than adequate 
evidence in the affidavit to support the issuance of a search warrant and denies the 
defendant's motion to suppress" (R. 270-71). 
Defendant fails to show that the trial court's ruling is incorrect. In challenging the 
ruling, defendant first asserts that the trial court "acknowledged that the affidavit 
4
 The affidavit more fully describes the Agent King's observations. Agent King 
used CI control methods, including searching the CI before and after the transaction and 
monitoring the transaction electronically and visually. On one of the buys, Agent King 
and assisting agents observed the unwitting informant go into defendant's residence to 
make the drug purchase. On the other buy, Agent King and assisting agents witnessed the 
unwitting informant go in and then out of defendant's residence following the purchase 
(R. 190-91). Defendant does not challenge the trial court's recognition that facts 
concerning the unwitting informant's reliability are not always available (R. 269). Such 
facts necessarily cannot include a search of the unwitting informant's person for drugs 
before the buy. 
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contained no separate evidence regarding the reliability of any informant, but concluded 
that such failure is not fatal." App. Br. at 12. First, defendant mischaracterizes the 
court's concern about verification of reliability. The ruling plainly reflects the court's 
satisfaction with the reliability of the confidential informant who supplied information to 
Agent Van Orden, information which undisputedly helped establish defendant's drug 
involvement (R. 270). Rather, the court's concern obviously went to the unspecified 
reliability of the confidential and unwitting informants who served Agent King in two 
drug buys just days before the affidavit was drafted (R. 269). While the reliability of 
these latter two informants was not stated, the court noted, "[f]ailure to provide separate 
evidence regarding the reliability of an informant is not fatal in and of itself, and when an 
informant is an 'unwitting' informant, such facts often are not available" (R. 269). 
Defendant makes no legal argument or cites to any authority challenging the trial court's 
view that the undetermined reliability of an informant, especially an unwitting informant, 
is not fatal in determining probable cause. See State v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269, 271-72 
(Utah 1999) (,,f[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research.'") (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988)) (additional citation omitted); State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(Utah 1989) (asserting that "[a] brief must contain some support for each contention," and 
declining to rule on issue where the defendant's brief "wholly lacked legal analysis and 
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authority to support his argument"). Moreover, the reliability of the confidential 
informant is immaterial where the informant was subjected to the control methods recited 
in the affidavit, to wit: "searching the CI before and after the transaction, placing a 
transmitter on the CI and monitoring the transaction electronically and visually" (R. 190). 
Defendant also fails to marshal the evidence in support of the ruling. Instead, 
defendant simply states that the court noted that the officer was a twelve-year veteran 
with extensive experience in drug cases and that the officer had merely gathered 
unverified information from informants through other police officers that controlled 
substances were being sold out of defendant's residence. App. Br. at 12-13. At the very 
least, defendant has failed to note (1) the citizen's informant's observations of heavy 
traffic indicating drug trade at defendant's residence (R. 269-70); (2) that Agent Van 
Orden used a reliable confidential informant who asserted that defendant sold drugs (R. 
270); and (3) that Agent King witnessed the unwitting informant in one drug buy go into 
defendant's residence and return with methamphetamine (R. 270). Moreover, in support 
of his argument, defendant cites only State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995). 
However, defendant's recitation of the facts of Covington, which found the affidavit set 
out sufficient probable cause for an all persons warrant, supports the court's ruling in this 
case. Thus, defendant again fails to support his claim with relevant argument or citation 
to authority. See Thomas, 974 P.2d at 271-72. In sum, defendant fails to show that the 
court incorrectly found there was probable cause to support the search. 
i4 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVIDED 
ANY RECORD SHOWING THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
FAILURE TO CONSIDER CERTAIN TRANSCRIPTS AND 
VIDEOTAPES WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF 
THE CASE 
"[An appellate court] review[s] a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel 
by first determining whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, 
determining whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. State v. 
Severance. 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 
446 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). 
"Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but 
must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
Thus, when a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on 
appeal, the claim should be reviewed only "if the . . . record is adequate to permit 
decision of the issue." State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
Further, an appellate court will "assume the regularity of the proceedings below when 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal." Blubaugh. 904 P.2d at 699 
(citations omitted). In State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has 
the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate 
record. Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a 
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unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine. 
This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its 
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record. 
Id. at 293 (citations omitted).5 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
in failing review the hearing on defendant's pro se motion to suppress and 
"videotapes," and in failing to present any additional information in support of his 
motion. App. Br. at 15. However, because defendant has failed to provide this Court 
with any record in support of his claim, this Court should decline to even consider it.6 
5
 See also rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("The argument shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); State v. Thomas. 
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (refusing to consider inadequately briefed claim under 
rule 24(a)(9), and stating "that this court is not ma depository in which the appealing party 
may dump the burden of argument and research"') (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988)) (original citation omitted). 
6
 Additionally, defendant has at no point moved for an evidentiary hearing, 
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to create a record establishing 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant argues that his counsel merely argued the 
legal position in his motion without calling any witnesses. However, counsel did 
consider a tape recorded conversation between Agent Acker and the prosecutor, from 
which he may have been further assured of the reasonableness of presenting the motion 
without witnesses. See State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (the reviewing 
court will give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not 
question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them) (citing 
Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)). Moreover, to the extent that any 
record of prior relevant proceedings is unavailable, as defendant asserts, see App. Br. at 
10, the burden is plainly on defendant to reconstruct it. See Utah R. App. P. 12(g) ("If no 
report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is 
unavailable,... the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings 
from the best available means, including recollection."); Guardian State Bank v. 
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Alternatively, defendant's claim fails for lack of record support. See State v. 
ArgueHes, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (rejecting ineffective assistance upon claim 
counsel prevented the defendant from testifying where neither the record nor the 
defendant's brief indicated what his testimony would have been if he had testified); 
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 183, 188 n.26 (Utah 1990) (finding that the defendant had 
failed to show prejudice in his counsel's failure to investigate a particular witness 
because "[he had] not provided this court with any evidence concerning what [the 
witness] would have testified to if he had been called during trial"); State v. Callahan. 
866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) (summarily disposing of claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where neither the record nor defendant's brief identified witnesses 
that counsel failed to subpoena or alleged the substance of their testimony); Severance. 
828 P.2d at 1070 (finding no reasonable probability of a different result at trial where 
the record did not indicate whether a witness would have testified more favorably at 
trial, and evidence against the defendant was overwhelming). In sum, this Court 
should reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Humpherys. 762 P.2d 1084, 1089-90 (Utah 1988) (purpose of the rule is to avoid the 
court's attempting to recreate the record of a hearing based upon conflicting testimony of 
counsel). In the absence of the record defendant asserts his counsel was ineffective in 
overlooking, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is purely speculative. 
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POINT III 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S PRO SE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
SUBSTANTIALLY FAILS TO CONFORM TO THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE, AND BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE 
GENERALLY UNSUPPORTED BY ANY RECORD EVIDENCE, 
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER THEM 
A. This Court will Decline to Consider 
An Issue Inadequately Briefed on Appeal. 
'"[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269, (Utah 1999) (quoting 
State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). "Furthermore, 'it is well established 
that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to 
adequately brief.'" Id (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998)). 
See also State v. Vigil. 922 P.2d 15,25 (Utah App. 1996) (refusing to consider challenge 
to trial court's failure ask prospective jurors a requested question unsupported by any 
factual analysis); State v. Stereer. 808 P.2d 122,125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) ("Because 
defendant fails to cite support or provide any meaningful analysis as to [arguments 
concerning the search of a vehicle], we decline to rule on them.").. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides criteria that are essential for 
a reasonably founded, intelligible argument on appeal.7 This Court has regularly declined 
7
 Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides in pertinent part: 
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to consider an argument which does not comply with the rule. See State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247, 247 (Utah App. 1992) ("We have routinely refused to consider arguments 
which do not include a statement of the facts properly supported by citations to the 
record."); State v. Garza. 820 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 1991) (court refuses to reach an 
issue because defendant "failed to include a statement of facts in her brief, as required by 
Rule 24(a)(7)"). Other than a conclusion, defendant's supplemental brief lacks every 
requirement set forth in rule 24.8 In particular, defendant's brief lacks (1) a statement of 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved 
in the trial court; 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief 
unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The 
addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the 
challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
8
 The State recognizes that because defendant's motion is directed to his 
supplemental brief, no jurisdictional statement or statement of the case would be needed 
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issues presented for review with a citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court, (2) a statement of the case, (3) any citation to the record, and 
(4) any meaningful argument or citation to legal authority. Therefore, the Court should 
decline to consider defendant's claims. 
B. This Court Must Presume Regularity Where 
Defendant Has Not Made Part of the Record 
Evidence Supporting His Claims, 
More importantly, this Court cannot evaluate the validity of the claims defendant 
asserts in his supplemental brief because he has failed to provide record support for any 
of those claims: 
Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and 
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." 'Absent 
that record defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation 
which the review court has no power to determine. This Court simply 
cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record.' " State v. Barella. 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 
1986) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 
293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1443, 75 L.Ed.2d 
799(1983)). 
State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1994) (affirming trial court's denial of challenges 
for where the defendant failed to supply transcript of jury voir dire). "If an appellant fails 
because those requirements are at least partially satisfied by defendant's opening brief, 
filed by his appellate counsel. However, defendant's opening brief challenged only the 
denial of his motion to suppress and a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
and it limited its rendition of the facts accordingly. Br. of App. at 6-7, 9-15. Defendant's 
supplemental brief, on the other hand, primarily attacks proceedings at the preliminary 
hearing, hearing on his pro se motion to dismiss, and trial, but contains no factual 
statement of these proceedings. 
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to provide an adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the 
proceedings below." Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) cert, denied, 493 
U.S. 1033,110 S.Ct. 751 (1990) (emphasis added). Utah's appellate courts have 
uniformly approved the regularity of proceedings in criminal cases where the defendant 
has failed to make part of the record on appeal evidence necessary to the evaluation of a 
claim of error. See State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997) (competency 
hearing); State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403,405 (1986) (plea hearing); State v. Jones. 657 
P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982) (closing argument); Lavton City v. Longcrier. 943 P.2d 645, 
661 (Utah App. 1999) (witness testimony); State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah 
App. 1995) (witness testimony); State v. Maas. 846 P.2D 468, 474 (Utah App. 1993) 
(closing argument). 
Defendant asserts five claims of error in his supplemental brief, which are a grab 
bag of cavils that are uniformly unsupported by record citations and which, with the 
exception of the fifth claim, generally depend on alleged evidence that is not part of the 
record: 
L Prosecution's Use of Alleged False Evidence 
Defendant claims that during the hearing on his pro se motion to dismiss, heard on 
April 28,1998, Agent Acker falsely testified that he found "a large chunk of 
methamphetamine weighing 6.5 grams" at defendant's residence. Supp. Br. App. at 2. In 
support, defendant asserts that Agent Van Orden, the "designated finder," never stated 
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that she found "any large chunk of methamphetamine . . . in her police report or search 
warrant inventory " Supp. Br. App. at 3. Defendant also asserts that the agent for the 
Weber State University Crime Lab never testified to finding any "large chunk of 
methamphetamine weighing 6.5 grams" at the preliminary hearing. Supp. Br. App. at 3. 
Not only is defendant's argument completely devoid of record citations, but Agent 
Van Orden's police report and search warrant inventory are not part of the record on 
appeal. Moreover, defendant's claim that Agent Acker testified falsely is not supported 
by the record. At the hearing on defendant's pro se motion to dismiss, Agent Acker read 
into the record his report that he had found a small zippered bag on the couch in the front 
room of defendant's residence (R. 389Tab 1:31). According to the report, the bag 
contained a small Zip-Loc baggie which contained a "large chunk of methamphetamine 
which later weighed out to be about 6.5 grams" and some vials and bottles also containing 
methamphetamine, all of which he estimated weighed about a quarter of an ounce (R. 
389:Tab 1:31-35). He also stated that he weighed the "large chunk" without removing it 
from the Zip-Loc baggie, and that his weight measurements often differed from those of 
the crime lab (R. 389:Tab 1:28-29, 35). Consistent with Agent Acker's testimony, Agent 
Van Orden verified at trial that she found a zippered bag containing "approximately a 
quarter ounce of meth" distributed among the various vials and baggies (R. 391:10-11).9 
9
 A gram "is equal to about 1/28 of an ounce." Webster's New World Dictionary 
628 (College ed. 1956). Therefore, the approximate one-quarter ounce of 
methamphetamine found by Agent Van Orden confirmed the 6.5 grams of 
methamphetamine attested to by Agent Acker. 
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Further, although Don Thurgood, a criminalist with the Utah State Crime Lab, did not 
testify at the preliminary hearing how much methamphetamine the vials and baggies 
contained (R. 388:36, 39), at trial he stated that collectively the vials and baggies in the 
zippered bag contained 7.6 grams of methamphetamine (R. 390:241-45). Thus, at worst, 
Agent Acker's estimates were in error by only a few tenths of a gram, a discrepancy that 
hardly proves he testified falsely. 
Defendant also asserts that he possesses audio and videotapes and documents that 
he was prevented from presenting to the jury that allegedly prove that the prosecutor and 
police officers made false statements at trial and pretrial hearings and that he was 
prejudiced by Judge Brent W. West's "biased" opinions in pretrial hearings. Supp. Br. 
App. at 3. Defendant has failed to state what false or biased statements were made, when 
or where such statements were made, and where such statements appear in the record. 
Further, the alleged tapes or documents on which defendant relies are not part of the 
record on appeal. 
2. Allegation of Search without Warrant or Supporting Affidavit 
Defendant asserts that the search warrant and the supporting affidavit did not even 
exist when the search was executed and that the affidavit falsely relied on nonexistent 
confidential informants and police surveillance and that it was libelous. Supp. Br. App. at 
4-7. In support, defendant claims that he possesses the videotape of a conversation at the 
preliminary hearing between the prosecutor and Agent Acker while Judge West was out 
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of the courtroom in which Agent Acker acknowledged that "he did not know an affidavit 
went with a search warrant." Supp. Br. App. at 4. However, the videotape is not part of 
the record on appeal, and so it is impossible to evaluate defendant's claim. Moreover, to 
the extent there is a record on this point, Agent Acker testified at the hearing on 
defendant's pro se motion to dismiss that during the conversation he merely informed the 
prosecutor that he did not want to disclose the identities of the confidential informants for 
their protection (R. 389:Tab 1:17-21). 
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to Subpoena Witnesses 
Defendant appears to claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to meet 
with him before trial to discuss trial strategy and to list witnesses defendant wanted 
subpoenaed at trial. However, defendant's claim is unsupported by any record evidence 
about what witnesses defendant requested or their expected testimony. See Br. of Applee. 
at Point II (discussing defendant's failure to show ineffective assistance of counsel). 
4. Denial of Right to Confront Confidential Informants 
Defendant claims that he was denied his right to confront confidential informants, 
who allegedly gave false information helping to establish probable cause to search his 
residence. Supp. Br. App. at 8-9. This argument is unsupported by any citation to the 
record or controlling authority or any reference to what information was false or to which 
officers the information was given. 
Moreover, the claim in without merit. The trial court correctly explained that 
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because the prosecution did not intend to use any information from informants in its case-
in-chief and because there was no indication that they possessed exculpatory information, 
it was unnecessary at that stage of the proceedings for the prosecution to disclose the 
identity of its informants (R. 389:Tab 1:59). See State v. Collier. 736 P.2d 231, (Utah 1987) 
("The right to be confronted with the witnesses against him does not automatically give a 
defendant the right to have disclosed to him by the prosecution the identity of a 
confidential informer.") (citing McCrav v. Illinois. 386 U.S. 300, 308-9, 311-13 (1967)); 
State v. Neilsen. 727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986) ("As a matter of due process, the identity 
of a confidential informant must be disclosed only when such disclosure is 'essential to a 
fair determination of the issues.9") (quoting State v. Forshee. 611 P.2d 1222,1224 (Utah 
1980)). Defendant fails to argue that confrontation with any informant could have 
provided information useful to his defense. See id. 727 P.2d at (summarily disposing of 
due process challenge to prosecution's refusal to disclose confidential informant's 
identity where the defendant "[could] not make some showing that disclosure of an 
informant's identity [was] material and essential to his defense").10 Moreover, at no point 
does defendant assert that he was not involved in the drug trafficking observed by 
10
 Defendant also appears to claim that police officers gave testimony at trial that 
was double hearsay, apparently a reference to the officers' repetition of information given 
to them by informants. Supp. Br. App. at 9. The argument is made in a single sentence 
without any citation to the record or legal authority or reference to the particular 
statements being challenged. The Court should decline to consider it. See State v. 
Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where defendant's 
brief "wholly lacked legal analysis and authority to support his argument"). 
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informants or that he was not in possession of the methamphetamine and marijuana 
discovered in his home when the police executed the warrant. 
5. Trial Court9s Error in Finding Warrant Technically Sufficient 
Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the warrant was 
technically sufficient. Supp. Br. App. at 9-12. In support of his claim, defendant argues 
that neither the warrant nor affidavit is time-stamped, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-
23-204 (1999), and that the affidavit in support of the warrant is illegible, omits the year 
in the date, and evidences two different signers because of discrepancies in the 
handwriting of the date. Supp. Br. App. at 10-11. 
"Generally, an issue must be expressly preserved below to warrant appellate 
consideration." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993) (stating "to ensure 
trial court's opportunity to consider an issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah 
requires 'that a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of 
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record"1 (quoting State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987))). See also Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 
1996) (refusing to consider claims not addressed in petitions or by district court where the 
defendant had "not attempted to show the applicability of either [the plain error or 
exceptional circumstance] exceptions"); State v. GotschalL 782 P.2d 459,463 (Utah App. 
1989) (declining to consider argument not presented to trial court or argued as plain error 
on appeal). 
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The claim of technical insufficiency was not preserved for appeal. Defendant 
alleged the above-referenced deficiencies in his motion to dismiss on April 28, 1998. 
However, defendant marshaled these alleged defects not to show that the warrant was 
technically deficient, but to show that the affidavit and warrant had likely been forged or 
tampered with, and the trial court heard defendant's argument only with those serious 
considerations in mind (R. 389:Tab 1:1—14).11 Because defendant did not give the trial 
court the opportunity to consider the argument he now raises, or argue plain error on 
appeal, the Court should decline to consider it. Further, defendant has again failed to cite 
to the record in support of his claim, and the only relevant authority he cites is contrary to 
his position. See State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Utah 1983) (where 
preprinted form affidavit in support of a search warrant was left blank concerning the date 
of the informant's observations and the date the information was given to the affiant, any 
defect in the affidavit caused by the blanks was required to be disregarded where the 
defendants did not contend the blanks in any way infringed upon their substantial rights). 
In any event, defendant's claim that the warrant and affidavit were technically 
deficient is unfounded. Courts have uniformly found that technical defects in the warrant 
are disregarded where the defendant's substantial rights are unaffected. See Anderton. 
11
 Only defendant's mistaken reference to section 77-23-204(2)(a), which provides 
that "[t]he magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of the duplicate original 
warrant on the face of the original warrant," might have suggested to the trial court that 
defendant was attacking the technical sufficiency of the warrant (R. 389: Tab 1:44-45). 
However, the court never addressed the argument, evidently recognizing that the 
subsection relied on by defendant applied only to telephone warrants. 
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688 P.2d at 1261-62, supra: State v. Bradshaw. 680 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah 1984) (police 
chiefs failure to sign warrant affidavit in space above signature of magistrate did not 
invalidate search warrant or result in prejudice to defendant, where police chief signed the 
affidavit at the top of the page and swore on oath that his statements in it were true); 
People v. Blake. 640 N.E.2d 317, 321 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (inadvertent omission of time, 
date and judge's signature from search warrant did not necessarily invalidate warrant 
where written complaint under oath was presented to issuing judge in person; apparent 
purpose of requirement that search warrant show time and date of its issuance is to permit 
officers executing warrant to determine whether it has expired due to passage of time and 
to document time of issuance for purposes of judicial review). State v. Miller. 815 
S.W.2d 28, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (failure of search warrant to state time and date of 
issuance did not require quashing of warrant and suppression of evidence derived 
therefrom where warrant was applied for, issued, and executed on the same day); 
Commonwealth v. Hamlin. 469 A.2d 137, 140 (Pa. 1983) (refusing to find omission of 
date and time of issuance of search warrant where the defendant could not show that he 
was prejudiced by the misdating). 
Agent Acker testified that Judge Lyon signed and dated both the affidavit and 
warrant in his presence on March 14, 1997, that Judge Lyon began to write the wrong 
date on the affidavit and then corrected himself, that the warrant was served on the 
afternoon of March 14, and that Agent Acker had no knowledge of any forgery of the 
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documents (R. 389:Tab 1:15-16, 25-26). Finding Agent Acker's sworn testimony 
credible, and contrary to defendant's assertion, see Supp. Br. App. at 10, the trial court 
made substantial findings on the sufficiency of the affidavit and warrant: (1) that although 
Judge Lyon, acting as magistrate, neglected to fill in the year on the affidavit, the 
scribbled numeral for the day of the month on the affidavit was simply the result of Judge 
Lyon's having initially made a mistake; (2) based on the trial court's familiarity with 
Judge Lyon's signature, his signature on both the affidavit and the warrant appeared 
genuine; (3) that the court believed that Judge Lyon had signed both the affidavit and 
warrant on March 14, 1997, the date appearing on the warrant; and (4) the affidavit was 
not defective and had not been modified, altered or forged (R. 389:Tab 1:58). In sum, 
defendant has failed to show that his substantial rights were affected by the partial 
omission of the date on the affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2*f day of November, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General Attorney uenerai 
/ Tf^MXTFTT-I A T5T?rYNJCTrYW KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Maurice Richards, Public Defender 
Association, Inc. of Weber County, attorneys for defendant, 2568 Washington Blvd., 
Suite 102, Ogden, Utah 84401, and Tracey Joe McCloy, pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, 
Utah 84020, this 2 £ _ day of November, 1999. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose 
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on 
appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate 
page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief 
where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall 
be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is 
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of 
the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact 
and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be 
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall 
not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the 
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall 
contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited 
in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all 
cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the 
court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, 
or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and 
if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response 
of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited 
to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply 
brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this 
rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as 
"appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower 
court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms 
such as "the employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right 
corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or 
transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the 
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in 
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence 
was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not 
exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages 
containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing 
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of 
this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the 
length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first 
filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and 
Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of 
the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief of the 
appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the 
cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50 
pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer to the 
original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's 
response to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second 
brief shall not exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a 
second brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of 
authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the court. The 
court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more 
than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, 
any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may 
adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply 
briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities 
come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral 
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be 
filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the 
Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point 
argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state 
the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of 
filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented 
with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may 
be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may 
assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and shall 
comply with Rule 27. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OR UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff * MEMORANDUM DECISION 
v. * 
* 
TRACY J. MC CLOY, * Case No. 971900382 FS 
Defendant * Judge Roger S. Dutson 
JUL 2 0 1293 
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. This court 
has become very familiar with the facts of the case, having held several hearings, initially filed 
by Defendant, acting pro se, and subsequently, by his attorney. The court has read the file in it's 
entirety several times and attempted to sort out the facts. A previous decision was filed by the 
court in about April of this year, and some of the issues are the same as were discussed in that 
earlier decision. Other issues however, are raised in this motion 
In the present motion, Mr. McCloy asserts that the police have dealt with him unfairly, 
with undue harshness and unethically and asserts that because of that fact, the facts the 
magistrate relied on are insufficient and challenge the validity of a search warrant. Additionally, 
he claims the facts that the affidavit for the search warrant did not show the 'unwitting' 
informant to be reliable that the magistrate did not have adequate reliable information upon 
which to issue the search warrant in question. He claims the affidavit includes such items as 
prior alleged criminal misconduct of Defendant, other arrests by another officer which was 
prejudicial information relied on by the issuing magistrate, and other similar issues. 
First, the court acknowledges there was information in the search warrant affidavit which 
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should not have been included, including other arrests, Defendant's alleged record, etc. The 
court also finds that the Ogden Police were very zealously attempting to charge this Defendant 
with criminal offenses. This is based on the facts arising is this case and the court's history with 
this case and collateral cases involving this Defendant. There was egregious conduct by the 
officers during the execution of this or other warrants, including the shooting of the Defendant's 
dog, letting it lie on the ground without providing humane treatment for some time, and the dog 
eventually died from the injuries and insensitivity of the police. The court notes that in a prior 
case the police conducted a search warrant and confiscated a great volume of evidence and when 
the court ordered that the police either release certain items confiscated or bring charges 
justifying retention of that evidence, the court was initially stonewalled by the prosecution and/or 
police department in getting items released which should not have been retained. The court has 
taken this police/prosecution position into consideration in reviewing the claims of the Defendant 
in this case. 
In reviewing a magistrates action issuing a search warrant, the court must first determine 
what alleged facts are reliable upon which a magistrate could properly rely. Failure to provide 
separate evidence regarding the reliability of an informant is not fatal in and of itself, and when 
an informant is an 'unwitting' informant, such facts often are not available. Additionally, the 
reviewing court must rely on the 'totality' of the reliable facts which were before the magistrate 
at the time he issued the search warrant. 
The affidavit sets forth the fact that the affiant was a 12 year veteran police officer 
assigned to the narcotics strike force with a great deal of experience in drug cases, drug sales and 
general drug interdiction experience. About a month earlier, affiant had been contacted by 
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telephone by a purported resident near Defendant's residence. The complaint asserted heavy 
short term traffic, both vehicular and pedestrian, with numerous different people, staying only for 
short periods of time, as well as some staying longer. Such traffic peaked on Friday nights and 
continued through the weekends. Some of these visitors brought VCR's, stereos and other 
property to this house. Based on affiant's experience, this was common where drugs were being 
sold so he began investigating the complaint. Affiant received additional information from 
another agent asserting that a confidential informant had asserted that drugs could be purchased 
from Defendant. This second agent advised affiant that his CI had shown himself to be reliable 
in other specific instances. License numbers of vehicles going to the location were checked and 
it was determined by affiant that several of the vehicles registered owners were purportedly 
involved in drugs orreceiving stolen property. Another agent, agent King from another county, 
provided information which should not be considered by a magistrate, but said agent King did 
provide information about two purchases of drugs at Defendant's residence within fours days 
before the affidavit was prepared, using a 'CI' and an 'unwitting informant' to make those buys. 
He explained that the CI was wired and observed going into the residence by an undercover 
agent and the unwitting buyer was observed, and the drugs field tested positively for 
amphetamines. The affiant then included much improper information about Defendant's 
purported criminal history and his suspicions about Defendant being involved in illegal drug 
activities, some of said information which this court construes as capable of being inflammatory 
towards the Defendant. 
Upon careful consideration of the totality of properly included facts, and in considering 
the possibility of improper inflammatory statements being included in the affidavit and an 
overzealous attitude by the police towards the Defendant, the court concludes there was still 
more than adequate evidence in the affidavit to support the issuance of a search warrant and 
denies the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Dated this 17th day of July, 1998. 
±S 
ROGER STDUTSON, JUDGE ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing memorandum 
decision to the following parties by first class mail, postage pre-paid, this ZOdl day of July, 
1998: 
LES DAROCZI 
Prosecuting Attorney 
2380 Washington Boulevard 
2nd Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 
TRACY J. McCLOY 
Defendant 
1403 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84403 
TPrtM,\K/nort, 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
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IN THE 2nd District COURT 
Weber COUNTY, STATE OF Utah 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and say©: 
That the affiant has reason to bell r& that: 
On the person(e) of: 
Traeey J. McCloy, W, M, 51 10", 160, Mod, Blonde hair, Blue eyes, DOB 
6/18/67 SSN 528080365; Ut D/L #146747099 
That on the premises known as: 
1612 Kiesel Ave, Ogden, Utah, Door Front door on west side, Wood frame, 
White colored house. Covered porch, large square pillars supporting porch. 
Address numbers 1612 on one of the posts. Rear door located at the s/e 
corner of the house. Driveway located on che north side of house, 
In the City of Ogden, County of Weber, State of Utah, there is 
now certain property or evidence described as: 
—MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form. 
-Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic 
sandwich bags, 
-Materials for using marijuana: 
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flaxnmable paper with 
adhesive on one side, 
2. Pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while 
being smoked. 
-Personal notes, records of narcotic transactions, listing names, 
dates, amounts sold. 
-METHAMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance. 
-Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small 
plastic baggies. 
-Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for 
snorting methamphetamine, small spoons for snorting 
methamphetamine, mirrors for holding methamphetamine while being 
snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines, 
-Scales for weighing methaxnphetaming. 
-Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine> 
•Cash and evidence of illegal narcotics transactions. 
and that said property or evidence: 
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
Will be used to commit or^conceal a public offense. 
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Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are: 
Your Affiant is Agent Mark L. Acker 
Affiant is currently assigned as an Agent with the Weber Morgan Narcotics 
strike Force. Affiant is designated to investigate narcotics sales and 
possession offenses occurring in the Weber and Morgan County areas. 
Affiant is employed as a Police Officer with the Ogden Police Department and 
has been so employed for 12 years. 
Affiant was assigned to the Ogden Poiice Detective Division for 5 years. 
During the assignment with the Detective Division affiant was involved in 
numerous operations that involved trading stolen property for cash and 
narcotics, During that period of time affiant often worked closely with the 
Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force/ and on occasion with the Davis Metro 
Strike Force. These investigations involved surveillance, visual and 
electronic, documentation, controlled buys, confidential informant (CI) 
control, and the drafting and serving of numerous search warrants. These 
investigations resulted in arrests, successful prosecution, property 
recovery, and the recovery of illicit narcotics. 
Affiant is a graduate of the Utah Police Standards and Training Academy. 
Affiant is a graduate of the Utah Police Standards and Training Drug Academy, 
Affiant has successfully completed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
Operation Jetway Airport/Train Station/Small Package Interdiction School. 
Affiant has attended the 1995 and 1996 Utah Narcotics Officers Association 
annual training conferences and received training in narcotics 
investigations, CI management, electronic and visual surveillance techniques, 
under cover investigations, clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, and 
other drug interdiction instructions. 
Affiant received a block of training in Narcotics related Financial 
Investigation in February of 1996. 
Affiant has received several Ogden Police Department good work awards, and 
received the Business Leaders Against Organized Crime (BLOCK) Officer of the 
Year award for exceptional Police work for property sting operations 
conducted while working in the Detective Division. Your affiant was awarded 
the Ogden City Police Department Employee of the Month for August of 1996. 
Your affiant was awarded the Utah Narcotics Officers Association (UNOA) 
narcotics officer of the year for the State of Utah, Region 1, in September 
of 1996. 
During the first week of February of this year your affiant was 
contacted via telephone by an area resident about suspected drug sales 
activity at 1612 Kiesel Ave. and the involvement in that activity by the 
PAGE 2 
'APK-2U-98 flUN 1^  = 40 \>l\ HhdtK UUUNTY ftllUKNtY thA NU, BUI ddb OJUH r. uo 
resident there, who is Tracey McCloy. The citizen complainant told your 
affiant that there is heavy vehicle and pedestrian traffic at this residence, 
with numerous people in and out of the house all hours oZ che day and night. 
The complainant told your affiant that much of the traffic in and out of this 
house is short term, with the visitors staying for short periods of time, 
while others will stay for an hour or so. The complainant told your affiant 
that the traffic and activity peaks on Friday nights and continues on through 
the weekend. The complainant also claims to have seen people bring VCRs, 
stereos and other property items to "6his house. The complainant lives in the 
area, has witnessed this activity personally, and was very concerned about 
the activity. 
Your affiant knows through experience that heavy short term traffic, 
in particular on weekends, is a indication of drug sales and use. In 
addition the report of individuals taking property items into this residence 
increases the likelihood of illegal activity. Your affiant is aware that the 
trade of property, often stolen property, is becoming increasingly popular 
with the drug community. Based on the complaint your affiant began an 
investigation into suspect Tracey Joe McCloy at 1612 Kiesel Ave. 
Shortly after taking the telephone complaint your affiant had a 
discussion with Agent Vanorden concerning Tracey McCloy and his residence at 
a.612 Kiesel. Your affiant learned from this conversation that Agent Vanorden 
has been involved with a confidential informant (CI) who is familiar with 
Tracey McCloy. This informant told Vanorden that methamphetamine could be 
purchased at McCloy's residence readily. The informant also told Vanorden 
that a great deal of stolen property from the Ogden area is being traded for 
methamphetamine at McCloy'e residence. According to the informant Tracey 
McCloy is involved in the sales of methamphetamine and the stolen property 
trade. Your affiant learned from Agent Vanorden that this informant has 
conducted at least five controlled narcotics buys under the direction of 
Agent Vanorden which have resulted in multiple arrests and convictions, 
generated at least two successful search warrants, and resulted in the 
seizure of illegal narcotics. The information this informant has provided to 
Agent Vanorden has proved reliable. 
The citizen who called this complaint in to your affiant also 
provided your affiant with a list of license plate numbers that the citizen 
copied down from vehicles making stops at Tracey McCloy«s residence at 1612 
Kiesel. Your affiant conducted registration checks on these vehicle license 
numbers and found that at least three of these vehicles are registered to 
individuals reported to be involved in narcotics use, and at least one 
individual who has a history of thefts. At least one of these individuals 
shows, through an Ogden Police computer records check, to be an associate of 
Tracey McCloy. 
On 3/13/97 your affiant was contacted by Agent Brad King, Davis 
County Metro Narcotics with information concerning suspect Tracey McCloy at 
1612 Kiesel. I learned from Agent King that within the past four days Agent 
King has conducted two controlled narcotics buys from the residence at 1612 
Kiesel. Agent King used an informant (CI) and an unwitting informant to 
accomplish these buys. A quantity of methamphetamine was purchased from that 
residence during each of the buys. Agent King used CI control methods, 
including searching the CI before and after the transaction, placing a 
transmitter on the CI and monitoring the transaction electronically and 
visually. Agent King and„assisting Agents also followed the CI and the 
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unwitting informant to 1612 Kiesel, During one of the buys a Davis Metro 
Narcotics agent, working in an undercover capacity, went with the CI and the 
unwitting informant, and observed the unwitting go into 1612 Kiesel to make 
the purchase. During the other transaction Agent King and assisting agents 
witnessed the same unwitting go into the same residence at 1612 Kiesel, and 
come back out of the residence after the purchase was made. The purchased 
drug from both buys was field tested by Davis Metro agents and found positive 
for amphetamines. 
On the same date, 3/13/97, your affiant received additional 
information from Agent Brad King, Davis Metro Narcotics, concerning 
activities at 1612 Kiesel. Agent King informed your affiant that his agency 
arrested another suspect, in Davis County on drug related charges on March 
13th. This person is not connected with the investigation that Agent King 
has been conducting at 1612 Kiesel. The person who was arrested told Davis 
Metro agents that he/she is buying methamphetamine from a male by the name of 
Tracey who lives in Ogden, in a white house on Kiesel, between 16th and 17th 
streets. This same person also told Davis Metro agents that this Tracey has 
stolen property, such as stereos, in his residence. The arrested person 
claims that Tracey never leaves his house, and sells up to ounces of 
methamphetamine at a time from his house. This information is very similar 
to the information received on citizen complaints and from other informants. 
Further grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential 
informant(s) to be correct and accurate through the following independent 
investigation: 
Your affiant has searched Ogden Police computer records and found 
information concerning suspect Tracey McCloy and reported activities at his 
residence, 1612 Kiesel Ave. Your affiant located another citizen complaint 
taken in December of 1996. The complaint stated that two individuals are 
buying methamphetamine from a person who lives at 1612 Kiesel. The complaint 
also stated that guns and stolen property are being sold from that address. 
Your affiant is familiar with one of the names given in that complaint as a 
person who buys methamphetamine from 1612 Kiesel. Your affiant knows that 
person to be involved in the sales and use of methamphetamine. Your affiant 
has learned this information from another informant who has worked with your 
affiant within the past three months. Your affiant has also been involved in 
narcotics cases in which this person was a suspect. 
Your affiant has located at least one other complaint taken in 
November of 1996 that specifically names Tracey McCloy as a person who sells 
methamphetamine and marijuana. The complaint also specifies the address of 
1612 Kiesel where Tracey McCloy lives and sells drugs from. 
Your affiant has located at least one other complaint of suspected 
drug use/sales at 1612 Kiesel dating back to 1995. 
Your affiant has found verification through Ogden Police computer 
records that Tracey Joe McCloy has given an address of 1612 Kiesel Ave. as 
his residence. Case information shows that address reported as being Tracy 
McCloy's address as recent as October of 1996. Your affiant has also found 
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that Tracey McCloy has a prior drug distribution arrest as recent as 1995, 
drug arrests prior to 1995, has been a suspect in a drug sales case in 1994, 
and was the suspect in yet another complaint of suspected drug involvement in 
1994. 
Your affiant has also located in the State Wide Warrant system an 
active protective order, listing Tracey Joe Mccloy, DOB 6/18/67 as the 
respondent, and listing hie address as 1612 Kiesel, This information matches 
the information your affiant has found for suspect Tracey McCloy named in 
this affidavit. 
Your affiant knows Tracey McCloy to be involved in the use of illicit 
narcotics, as well as his involvement in the sales of these drugs. Your 
affiant has, learned through experience that individuals involved in the sales 
and use of narcotics often carry a quantity of the drug on their person, as 
well as drug paraphernalia and cash proceeds from the sales of drugs. 
Narcotics sold at street level quantities are easily concealed on a person. 
Your affiant has personally observed the residence at 1612 Kiesel 
Ave. and has the observed the address numbers of 1612 on a pillar on the 
front porch of that residence. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that the search warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items in the day time. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this HT dav of MI/fAAK. 19 
AFFIANT 
(9 y  AWf/ZAK. 
WkYk* 
W JUDGE IN THE frhd District COURT, 
IN AND FOR Weber COUNTY 
STATE OP Utah 
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IN THE 2nd D i s t r i c t COURT 
COUNTY OP Weber, STATE OF Utah 
SEARCH WARRAOT 
Proof by A f f i d a v i t under oath having been made t h i s day before roe by Mark L. 
Acker, I am s a t i s i f i e d that there i s probable cause to bel ieve that: 
on the person[a) of: 
Tracey J. McCloy, W, M, 5' 10", 160, Med. Blonde hair, Blue eyes, 6/18/67, 
SSN 525060365; Other features are: Ut D/L #146747099 
on the premises known as: 
1612 Kiesel Ave, Ogden, Utah Door Front door on west side, Wood frame, 
White colored house. Covered porch, large square pillars supporting porch. 
Address numbers 1612 on one of the posts. Rear door located at the s/e 
corner of the house. Driveway located on the north side of house. 
In the City of Ogden, County of Weber, State of Utah, there is now being 
possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described as; 
-MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried Conn. 
-Materials used to pacfcage marijuana, specifically, plastic 
sandwich bags. 
-Materials for using marijuana: 
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with 
adhesive on one side, 
2. Pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while 
being smoked. 
-Personal notes, records of narcotic transactions, listing names, 
dates, amounts sold. 
-METHAMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance. 
-Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small 
plastic baggies, 
-Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for 
snorting methamphetamine, small spoons for snorting 
methamphetamine, mirrors for holding methamphetamine while being 
snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines, 
-Scales for weighing methamphetamine. 
-Cat. substance used to dilute the methamphet amine. 
-Cash and evidence of illegal narcotic transactions. 
and that said property or evidence: 
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
Will be used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
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You are therefore commanded in the day time to raaXe a search of the above 
named or described person(s), vehicle(s)/ and premise(e) for the herein above 
named or described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part 
thereof, to bring it forthwith before me an the 2nd District Court, County of 
Weber, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the 
order of this court, 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this. i4_w ~ Udtd.
 isg? 
?TTrF fiff THE PEACE OC 
MAGISTRiftE OF THE 2nd D i s t r i c t COURT. 
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